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 This paper compares household debt conditions in the United States before and after 
the Great Recession of 2007 – 2009. I use a combination of data from the World Bank 
Development Indicators and the Bank for International Settlements to estimate a model using 
the Synthetic Control Method for Stata, which creates a depiction of what household debt in 
the U.S. would have looked like without the impacts of the Great Recession. As a reference 
point for countries that could be used to compile the weighted synthetic control group, I study 
the economic characteristics of Australia, Canada, France and Germany because these countries 
performed well under recessionary pressure. However, upon running the model, I find that the 
best fit for the data set uses Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Korea, Portugal, Germany and 
Denmark. The estimated model is best interpreted through a graph of the household debt 
service ratio in actual U.S. data and for the synthetic control group changing over time. It shows 
a clear rapid deleveraging trend for households over the course of the Great Recession, 
contrasting with a household debt service ratio that remains relatively high for the control 
group through the recovery period. I then discuss possible implications of my findings, including 
how the model’s similarities to Fisher’s household debt theory suggest its relevance in 






  The Great Recession, beginning December 2007 and coming to an official end in June 
2009 according to the most recent report from the National Bureau of Economic Research, was 
the worst period of economic downturn the United States has seen in post-war years in terms 
of the magnitude of the immediate effects on key economic performance indicators and the 
exceptional length of the period of recovery compared to the other most recent recessions. The 
events that characterized this recession can be primarily traced back to the increased lending 
and rising prices in the United States housing market. The surface potential for continued value 
increases in the future attracted home-buyers and helped to encourage lenders to create new 
debt instruments to satisfy them. As the number of subprime mortgages increased, so did the 
probability of mass defaults and financial frictions, which would be the perfect storm for a 
recession. By June 2007, this risk became a reality. It follows that this severe recession would 
affect various aspects of household finances even as it was caused by some of them, including 
the decisions they make regarding the type and amount of debt they hold. Household debt is a 
key topic for research regarding the Great Recession because of its intimate connection to the 
underlying cause of its events. It is vitally important that we understand the rippling effects 
substantial increases and subsequent drops in public debt can have through goods markets, 
labor markets, inflation and interest rates. In estimating a model that creates a synthetic 
control version of the United States that I can compare to the actual data, I contribute a clear 
visual of where the country’s household debt might be had we not experienced the major 
impacts of the Great Recession: decreased GDP, deflation, and increased unemployment. My 
model supports previous research that indicates a widespread deleveraging by households in 
 
the wake of the Great Recession as the need to reduce debt obligations grew stronger. It could 
also help to support Fisher’s theory that persistent deleveraging can both be encouraged by 
recessionary feelings of uncertainty about the economy and actually contribute to worsening 
the recession. At the very least, my findings combined with the assertations of previous 
literature support the further consideration of high debt service ratios as warning indicators 




 In my research on the works of other scholars relating to the impact of the Great 
Recession on household finance, I primarily studied three papers: Household Debt and Saving 
During the 2007 Recession (Chakrabarti, Lee, Klaauw & Zafar, 2011), Household Debt and the 
Great Recession (Garriga, Noeth, & Schlagenhauf, 2017) and Spending Behavior Change and 
Financial Distress During the Great Recession (Chalise & Anong, 2017). Each of these papers 
addresses important questions about how the Great Recession changed how families with 
varying demographic characteristics make household finance decisions to deal with job loss, 
negative income shocks, home equity loss, and other adverse impacts of the financial crisis. I 
also studied Fisher’s debt and deflation theory through his original 49 “creeds” published in 
1933 as well as an application of these “Fisher dynamics” in Mason and Jayadev (2014) to help 
lend clarity to the interpretation of my empirical results later in my paper. 
 The Great Recession has been mostly associated with the building and subsequent 
bursting of the housing bubble in the early 2000s. Homeowners saw sizable increases in 
 
housing values prior to June 2007, which led to more and more mortgage loans as new 
households entered the market. Garriga (2017) examined the changes in different forms of 
debt in the years leading up to and after the recession, and found that in 1999, average 
mortgage debt was highest for age 45 at $60,000. The peak then moved to age 42 in 2008 with 
a value of $117,000. Households then watched as their equity plummeted along with prices. 
The more mortgage debt a household accumulates, the greater the effect on their equity when 
prices decline, creating a snowball effect. Chakrabarti notes that those who purchases their 
homes after 2005 experienced the greatest losses because they had to pay the peak prices at 
the time of purchase (Chakrabarti et al, 2011, p. 4).  
 Household debt was steadily growing from 1990 to 2008 and then began to rapidly 
decline as the country slid in to recession. Garriga (2017) observed similarities between the 
decisions households made regarding their debt during the recession and a theory developed 
by Irving Fisher in 1933. Fisher hypothesized that if the household debt burden becomes too 
large during boom periods, it can cause households to have to “rebalance their balance sheets” 
and deleverage through sales and bankruptcies. This large selloff can create a positive supply 
shock in the economy, lowering prices and leading to a subsequent decrease in demand in labor 
markets—some trademarks of a recession (Garriga et al, 2017, p. 184). It appears that the 
effects of the recession align quite closely with Fisher’s theory. As conditions in labor markets 
worsen, the likelihood of defaults can increase as more people find themselves unemployed or 
underemployed (working in a job that they are perhaps over-qualified for that pays less than 
what their ideal occupation would). Concern that debtors may not be able to fulfill their current 
obligations arises and leads to greater illiquidity and decreased ability to obtain new credit, 
 
creating a snowballing effect during financial crises (Mason & Jayadev, 2014, p. 216). Garriga 
also suggests that the reason we ended up with so many mortgage defaults as households 
began to deleverage is partially because of the updates made to bankruptcy laws in 2005 that 
made bankruptcy a less accessible solution to financial distress (Garriga et al 2017, p. 201). 
 Changes in spending and saving behavior are discussed in two of these papers, 
particularly in how they relate to the financial position of households. Chakrabarti addressed 
the question of how households responded to the new conditions of the economy by looking at 
their spending. He notes that in the RAND survey used in his research, a median monthly 
spending cut of 20% was reported just between October 2008 and the time the survey was 
conducted in the following month. Cuts in monthly spending were found to be strongly related 
to unemployment, with an average cut of 18% among those unemployed in November 2008 
(Chakrabarti, Lee, Van der Klaauw, & Zafar, 2011, p. 11). Chakrabarti also observes a frequently 
reported increase in personal saving across demographic groups. This could be due to the 
relative constant average values of disposable income and the persistent drop in consumer 
spending.  
 Chalise (2017) tested two hypotheses regarding household spending behavior—first, 
that households who systematically spent more than their income prior to the Great Recession 
would be more likely to become financially distressed during the Great Recession that those 
who spent less than their income, and second, that households who switched from spending 
more to spending less than their income during the Great Recession reduced their chances of 
becoming financially distressed by doing so (Chalise & Anong, 2017, p. 52). Neither hypothesis 
could be supported by the findings. It turned out that in the second model used, which included 
 
binary variables for being a spender in 2007, being a spender in 2009 and changing to a saver in 
2009, individuals who switched to being savers during the recession were twice as likely to be 
financially distressed and prerecession spending habits were insignificant in predicting financial 
distress. However, as we would expect, being a spender in 2009 came with three times the 
likelihood of being financially distressed compared to people who were spending less than their 
income.  
 It is also important to note that in all three papers regarding household finance 
conditions in the United States that I reviewed, the authors found many ways in which certain 
demographic groups suffered more than others. The Great Recession was particularly harmful 
to younger, less educated individuals with lower incomes. African Americans and Hispanics 
were much more adversely affected than whites. Individuals in these categories seemed to be 
hit from all sides— they were more susceptible to dropping home values, more likely to be 
unable to make loan payments, and experienced higher rates of unemployment. Chakrabarti 
(2011) reported that the net worth disparity between median households and households in 
the bottom 30% in terms of income continued to increase from 2007 to 2013, from 4.53 to 5.49 
times the net worth of the lower group. Chalise (2017) also discussed the increased probability 
of becoming financially distressed associated with being in poor health. Those in good health 
had odds 37% lower than those in poor health (Chalise & Anong, 2017, p. 59). 
 As I broadened my knowledge of previous literature surrounding the Great Recession 
and its ripple effects reaching outside of the U.S., I studied a set of countries that emerged 
largely unscathed. The countries I will examine in comparison to the United States are Canada, 
Germany, France and Australia. All survived the global financial crisis with little to no 
 
macroeconomic turmoil and can serve to help estimate how the United States may have looked 
had the Great Recession never happened. GDP and the unemployment rate and the two major 
performance indicators that reveal significant differences between the U.S. and these other 
countries. For the most part, prior to the recession, Canada, Germany and France had much 
higher unemployment rates than the U.S. Once the Great Recession hit, the U.S. unemployment 
rate began to climb much faster and became the highest of the four countries by the start of 
2009. Canada’s lack of large unemployment increases can be attributed to the agility of regional 
labor markets in reacting to changing macroeconomic conditions (Dube and Polese, 2015, p. 
250). The main regions that experienced negative effects of the recession were ones closely 
linked to the automobile and lumber industries, the latter being heavily dependent on U.S. 
demand for housing materials that dropped sharply with the burst of the housing bubble (Dube 
and Polese, 2015, p. 236). What is even more interesting is that from 2007 to 2009, German 
unemployment actually declined, even in the midst of the worst modern global economic 
contraction. Australia’s unemployment rate also increased much slower than that of the U.S. 
from 2007 to 2009 (Hoffman & Lemieux, 2014, p. 4). 
 Most countries experienced a steep decrease in real GDP between 2007 and 2009, with 
the U.S. experiencing a rate of 4.7 percent (Hoffman & Lemieux, 2014, p. 5). Germany was 
similar to the United States while Canada and France showed slightly smaller drops and 
Australia saw barely any change at all. Contrary to initial ideas that the additional expenditure 
by Australian government intended to shore up demand during the global financial crisis was 
what helped Australia survive, Australia most likely weathered to storm more successfully than 
most countries as a result of stimulatory changes in net foreign demand (Makin, 2010, p. 15). 
 
Australia, Canada and Germany recovered with the most strength, seeing increases of over 8 
percent from mid 2009 to mid 2012 while France saw little GDP growth The United States 
struggled a bit more in these first few post-recession years with a growth rate of 6.9 percent 
(Hoffman & Lemieux, 2014, p. 6). 
 The goal of my research is to add to our understanding of how household debt in the 
United States was affected by and contributed to the Great Recession so that we can continue 
to learn from mistakes made during it and better equip individuals to deal with financial 
distress. By comparing the United States to the Stata-generated version of itself created using 
the data from other countries, I estimate a sort of counterfactual that sheds light on what the 
United States may have looked like had we avoided such substantial economic downturn. The 
counterfactual estimated makes it easy to see Fisher’s debt and deflation theory at work. 
 
Data 
 I used World Development Indicator data from the World Bank as well as Debt Service 
Ratios from the Bank for International Settlements to create the model. The set of World 
Development Indicators includes annual values for a wide variety of macroeconomic 
performance measures—everything from government expenditures on education as a percent 
of overall government expenditure to literacy and mortality rates. I use variables for the, 
unemployment rate, GDP growth rate, and inflation rate for each of the countries as predictor 
variables, as these are the typically referenced indicators of the broader economic conditions of 
a country. The main dependent variable of interest is the debt service ratio for households 
(hnpish) reported quarterly for each of the countries. This data set is obtained from the Bank 
 
for International Settlements and merged with the World Bank data to create my final data set 
used in the analysis. In general, a debt service ratio (DSR) represents the ratio of the total 
amount of debt obligations to the total amount of resources available to pay them. For 
households, this means all required household debt payments to total disposable income. The 
household DSR can be separated into two categories—mortgage debt and consumer debt—the 
latter of which can include credit card debt, pay day loans and any loans used purely for 
consumption rather than investment. The household DSR is commonly referred to as the 
household debt burden. Because disposable income has stayed rather constant since 2000, the 
household DSR can give us an idea of how the amount of debt households take on changes 
from period to period (Chakrabarti et al, 2011). These changes in debt, especially during periods 
of financial distress may have more to do with changes in income, inflation and interest rates 
and constraints imposed on households by these variables rather than actual changes in 
household preferences. I use a set of 17 OECD countries, included the United States, to conduct 
my analysis.  
 
Empirical Methods 
 The counterfactual is calculated using Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case 
Studies, or synth, for Stata developed by Abadie, Gardeazabal, Diamond and Hainmueller 
(2003, 2010, 2013). This software extracts characteristics of a set of comparison entities and 
creates a synthetic control entity that approximates the characteristics of the entity receiving a 
treatment or experiencing an event. In theory, this synthetic control entity will more closely 
approximate what the treated entity would look like without the treatment than simply taking 
 
an average of the group of comparison entities. This is valuable in cases of natural experiments 
created by policy changes or events because the researcher has no control over which entity is 
treated or how long the treatment lasts.  
I essentially assume that the United States is the only one of the countries in the set that 
experienced the recession at all for the purposes of obtaining a counterfactual. I argue that the 
other countries in the set experienced contractionary effects of the global financial crisis that 
ensued following the American-born Great Recession in a much smaller magnitude than the 
U.S. did, and thus can be used to comprise the synthetic control group. In this case, the United 
States is permanently affected by the Great Recession, so a counterfactual is the only picture 
we have of how the country would have fared had it not happened. Any changes in household 
debt post-2007 contain some residual effects of equilibrium changes stimulated by the Great 
Recession. 
Table 1 shows average values for the household DSR in the pre-recession period (1999 
Q1 to 2007 Q4), the Great Recession (2008 Q1 to 2009 Q2), and the post-recession/recovery 
period (2009 Q3 to 2016 Q4) for each of the countries in the final data set. I use 2008 Q1 as the 
beginning of the recession because since it didn’t officially start until December 2007, only part 
of the fourth quarter of 2007 experienced the full force of the recession. The United States is 
one of only four countries in the data set that shows and post-recession average dropping 
below the pre-recession average, indicating rapid deleveraging. In the data, the countryid 
variable equals 31 for the U.S., so I use that to declare the treatment unit as the U.S. and then 
state that the treatment period begins where the year-quarter variable equals 2008 Q1. I 
include my predictors—gdp_gr, infl_rate, unemp_rate, and hnpish_ for the fourth quarter of 
 
2007,  the first quarter of 1999, the first quarter of 2003 and the first quarter of 2005—and 
Stata estimates the synthetic control United State from there. 
 
Table 1: Initial Summary Statistics 
Country Name Average Household Debt Service Ratio 
 Pre-Recession 
(1999 Q1 – 2007 Q4) 
Great Recession 
(2008 Q1 – 2009 Q3) 
Post-Recession 
(2009 Q4 – 2016 Q4) 
Australia 13.01111 16.41667 15.54 
Belgium 5.75 6.50 7.323333 
Canada 11.13333 12.86667 12.49 
Germany 9.055556 7.85 6.976667 
Denmark 17.35556 22.75 18.57333 
Spain 7.416667 11.51667 8.61 
Finland 5.588889 7.833333 6.973333 
France 4.908333 5.95 6.223333 
United Kingdom 10.33056 12.71667 10.34 
Italy 3.869444 5.15 4.906667 
Japan 8.519444 7.583333 6.893333 
Korea 10.00 11.66667 11.77 
Netherlands 15.43889 18.26667 18.78667 
Norway 12.16389 15.88333 14.73333 
Portugal 9.155556 10.85 8.836667 
Sweden 9.411111 11.21667 11.12 
United States 10.26667 11.03333 8.906667 
 
Results 
 The synthetic control United States is a weighted combination of Belgium, Netherlands, 
Canada, Korea, Portugal, Germany and Denmark. Table 2 shows the weights for each of the 
countries, the largest portions coming from Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada. Table 3 
compares the values for each of the predictor variables between the United States and its 
synthetic version. It indicates a relatively close relationship for GDP growth, inflation rate, and 
 
unemployment rate, but shows an especially precise relationship for each of the pre-recession 
observations of the household DSR. This last of several models tested, with previous, less 
accurate models with higher root mean squared prediction errors, including the employment 
rate and substituting real GDP for the GDP growth rate. I chose this one for the synthetic 
control group’s closer approximation of the actual U.S. data in the pre-recessionary period, as 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
Table 2: Weight of Each Country Making Up the Synthetic Control United States 


















 Figure 1 compares changes in GDP growth rates for each of the countries that comprise 
a portion of the synthetic control group with those of the U.S. Though all countries experience a 
drop in GDP growth after the beginning of the Great Recession (indicated by the vertical 
 
dividing line on each of the graphs), the minimums that the GDP growth rates reach aren’t as 
low as the U.S. for Belgium and Korea. This may indicate that the synthetic control countries 
experienced contractionary effects brought on by the Great Recession, but potentially at a 
smaller magnitude than the U.S. Canada, Germany and Denmark seem to show larger increases 
in their GDP growth rates than the U.S. once the recovery period begins. 
 
 
Figure 1: GDP Growth Rate Changes Over Time 
 
 
Table 3: Predictor Variable Balance for United States (Treated) and the Synthetic Control 
United States (Synthetic) 
Predictor Variable Treated Synthetic 
gdp_gr 2.911746 3.016968 
 
infl_rate 2.706584 2.214242 
unemp_rate 4.954286 5.915677 
hnpish_(2007 Q4) 11.6 11.6279 
hnpish_(2005 Q1) 10.3 10.2937 
hnpish_(2003 Q1) 9.8 9.8039 
hnpish_(1999 Q1) 9.4 9.3776 
Figure 2: Household Debt Service Ratio (hnpish) over Time, Real United States Data Compared 
to the Synthetic Control United States 
Notes: The starting period is 156 on the horizontal axis, which represents 1999 Q1. The vertical 
dividing line indicates the beginning of the treatment period (directly following the start of the 




 Figure 2 is a graph showing the changes in the household DSR from the first quarter of 
1999 (where yq equals 156 on the graph) to the last period in the data, the fourth quarter of 
2016. The solid line represents the actual data for the United States, while the dashed line 
 
represents the synthetic United States created in Stata. The vertical line divides the graph into 
the pre-recession period and period after its official start, starting at the first quarter of 2008 
(where yq equals 192 on the graph). It is clear that the United States and its synthetic control 
version move closely together for the most part and in the same general direction until the 
start of the Great Recession. One can think of the Great Recession “treatment” as a sum total of 
the trademark events of recessions: large decreases in demand and consumption, deflation, 
increased unemployment and the feelings of uncertainty and worry that stem from households 
experiencing these events. After this point, the real household DSR quickly plummets to a level 
well below any observed in the nine-year pre-recession period. The synthetic control unit line, 
however, continues to climb after the recession hits and shows a peak at just over 12. We then 
see it start a gradual decline while the actual household DSR continues to fall rapidly. The 
behavior of the synthetic control unit suggests that the household DSR would have continued 
to increase and then hover around 11 and 12 had the country not experienced the Great 
Recession. The small increase shown by the solid line in the last two periods in the data may 
indicate that the recovery period for household debt after the Great Recession only just 
concluded at the end of 2016, almost 10 years after the initial downturn. 
It is important to remember that the movement of the household DSR can be a result of 
changes in one of both of two factors: the actual amount of household debt (including 
mortgage and consumer debt) and the amount of household disposable income. As previously 
mentioned, research indicates that for the most part, households in the U.S. were forced to 
deleverage as a result of the Great Recession. With the amount of disposable income staying 
relatively constant and many consumers cutting back on spending, most of the changes in the 
 
household DSR can be explained by changes in the amount of household debt, influenced by 
income, deflation and interest rates (Chakrabarti et al, 2011) (Masona & Jayadev, 2014). 
 
Discussion 
 These results contribute to Irving Fisher’s 1933 theory that if households accumulate 
too much debt, they may be forced to deleverage in the event of economic downturn, which, if 
done on a nationwide scale, will then contribute to worsening the circumstances of the 
economy as a whole through deflation and its subsequent effects on other economic variables 
(Fisher, 1933). This suggests that there may be a simultaneous causality issue—the beginning of 
a recession triggers the first round of deleveraging, but then the selloffs and bankruptcies work 
to prolong and magnify the recession.  
 The large majority of the steady increase in overall household debt can be attributed to 
a substantial and persistent increase in mortgage debt leading up to the Great Recession. The 
subprime lending trend is largely to blame. As Americans watched housing prices rise, they 
could see more and more opportunity for investment and home ownership became more and 
more attractive. This trend was the trigger needed for the initial state of over-indebtedness 
preceding financial crises that Fisher described (Fisher, 1933). The practice of lending larger and 
larger amounts of money to households whose credit would have normally kept them from 
receiving such a loan as home values continued to climb heightened the risk of a crash in the 
housing market when households would no longer be able to make their loan payments. With 
this crash in the housing market, we saw subsequent effects in the stock and labor markets, 
triggering the worst post-war recession in the U.S. The consumer debt component of household 
 
debt is negatively affected by these market fluctuations as well, with more consumers cutting 
their spending in the wake of job loss or decreases in their net wealth, further lowering the 
amount of overall household debt. Moving forward, it is imperative that we learn from the 
excessive subprime lending mistake that set these events in motion. 
 Though debt is a necessary part of our financial system that creates opportunity for 
increased consumption, investment and innovation for our economy, it is clear that there exists 
a threshold. Without debt, most ordinary people would never be able to save up enough 
currency to purchase things like homes, cars or land. However, debt can only help to boost 
consumption or investment when GDP, and subsequently, disposable income, keep pace with 
its growth. If not, the household DSR continues to grow and a relatively larger and larger share 
of disposable income will need to be used to meet debt obligations, leaving less and less to be 
used for consumption. These stimulatory effects that household debt can potentially have on 
the economy as a whole can contribute to creating jobs, increasing labor demand and boosting 
GDP. However, a large enough household debt burden can put us at risk of a pervasive desire 
for the rebalancing of household finances when people lose confidence in economic conditions. 
We should be asking ourselves “how much is too much?”.  
 Figure 1 shows the household DSR staying high without the many market disruptions 
from the Great Recession, which could lead us to wonder if that could be a good thing.  
However, I argue that a household debt burden this large is not sustainable—it will eventually 
be brought down with economic contractions as we flow through more business cycles. Irving 
Fisher’s debt and deflation theory came immediately after the Great Depression began to 
subside, but we still watched as public leverage rose consistently for the past six decades 
 
(Mason & Jayadev, 2014, p. 217). Several models have been discussed in the recent decades 
that can be applied to the early 2010s. They suggest that suppressed consumption can be 
attributed to households adjusting their behavior after accumulating too much debt. The idea is 
that households with more debt attempted to decrease their consumption after the shock to 
home values, but other households with less debt didn’t increase their consumption to offset it, 
making the recession harder to remedy (Mason & Jayadev, 2014, p. 218). My empirical results 
help to shed light on how drastically household debt was impacted by constraints imposed on 
the public by the Great Recession and support Fisher’s theory that massive rebalancing leads to 
externalities that contribute to worsening the recession. 
  
Conclusion 
 The United States saw a steady increase in household debt in the decade leading up to 
the Great Recession. A significant part of the blame can be placed on rising prices in the 
housing market encouraging investment. To keep up with trends, creditors lowered standards 
and increased subprime lending, increasing the risk of defaults. The housing bubble finally burst 
in 2007, creating disruptions in stock and labor markets that started the Great Recession. 
Households were forced to deleverage, leading to positive supply shocks and further deflation. 
Feelings of economic uncertainty further encouraged deleveraging and the household debt 
service ratio continued to fall. In this paper, I used the Synthetic Control Method for 
Comparative Case Studies in Stata to estimate a counterfactual for how the household DSR 
would have fluctuated had the United States not experienced the negative impacts on GDP and 
increased unemployment from the Great Recession. My results suggest that the household DSR 
 
would have remained high for several years before gradually falling rather than rapidly 
dropping. I argue that a high household debt burden is not sustainable based on Irving Fisher’s 
debt and deflation theory and later works discussing Fisher dynamics. As a country, we should 
recognize the relevance of a high household DSR as a warning indicator for an imminent 
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